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This paper reports on European public perceptions of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as determined
through six focus groups, one held in each of the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, Belgium and
Spain. The development of opinion and the emergence of concerns were observed via phased exposure
to a specially commissioned film providing an overview of CCS technology, its rationale and associated
debates, supplemented by additional information on national energy mixes. In general there was a high
level of commonality in opinion and concerns across the six countries, with only minor differences. Thearbon capture and storage
erceptions
ttitudes
concerns that emerged were not allayed by the information provided. On the contrary, there was evi-
dence of a shift from initial uncertainty about CCS to negative positions. CCS was generally perceived
as an uncertain, end-of-pipe technology that will perpetuate fossil-fuel dependence. Noting the polit-
ical context to CCS, we conclude that advocates will likely find the European public opinion context a
challenging one in which to achieve deployment, particularly for onshore storage, except where local
communities perceive real economic or other benefits to CCS.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.. Introduction
In perhaps the most important respects, public perceptions
esearch on CCS has been generally consistent in its findings. From
he days of early work (e.g. Gough et al., 2001, 2002; Shackley et al.,
005), studies internationally have tended to find that publics are
nfamiliarwith CCS technology relative to other climatemitigation
ptions, though this is changing over time; that publics tend to pre-
er energy efficiency, renewable energy and to some extent nuclear
ower over CCS; that they have specific concerns about the safety
nd reliability of CCS; but that despite this, if given enough infor-
ation, the majority will express somewhat reluctant acceptance
or CCS, principally as a bridging technology away from fossil fuels
e.g. Reiner et al., 2006; van Alphen et al., 2007; Tokushige et al.,
007; Ha-Duong et al., 2009; de Best-Waldhober et al., 2009a,b;
ltra et al., 2010; Fleishman et al., 2010). To this general picture,
ther studies have added detail on specific influences: for exam-
le, the role of gender in relation to risk perception by stakeholders
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oi:10.1016/j.ijggc.2011.06.005(Stephens et al., 2009); and theway inwhich communication about
CCS to the public may be rated as more trustworthy (though not
necessarily more persuasive) when stakeholders from a variety of
backgrounds are involved in communicating about CCS in collabo-
ration rather than separately (ter Mors et al., 2009).
The reluctant acceptanceof CCShas resonances in the changes in
British public views of nuclear power (at least, pre-the Fukishima,
tsunami-related incident in 2011), in part paralleling the growing
understanding of the significance and urgency of climate change
(Bickerstaff et al., 2008). Yet it is important to bear inmind that few
studies, particularly in Europe, have had the opportunity to study
publicopinionofCCS in relation toprospectiveor actualCCS storage
sites. Where this has been possible, trust in statutory decision-
makers, developers, other actors and planning processes are key
factors involved in public perceptions (Huijts et al., 2007;Desbarats
et al., 2010). Despite this, Shackley et al. (2009)were surely justified
in observing that efforts at understanding, engaging and commu-
nicating with the European public and wider stakeholders on CCS
have been weak to date (Shackley et al., 2009).
With this in mind, the EC-funded ‘NearCO2’ project was com-
missioned in the period shortly prior to the funding of twelve CCS
demonstration projects in Europe, in order to inform communica-
tion and engagement practice. NearCO2 work has been designed
with an acute awareness of the role of information framing when





























































Focus group participants by gender.
Country Gender Total
Male Female
Germany 5 5 10
Poland 4 6 10
United Kingdom 5 5 10
Spain 5 4 9
Netherlands 5 4 9
Belgium 5 3 8360 P. Upham, T. Roberts / International Journa
liciting and testing public responses. For the present study, previ-
us public perceptions work that sets CCS in the context of climate
hange urgency and alternative technologies is particularly rele-
ant (e.g. Fleishman et al., 2010). More generally, the literatures
n risk perception, science and technology studies, social psychol-
gy and others suggest that public perceptions of CCS are unlikely
o be a special case: despite CCS having particular characteristics,
ublic perceptions of CCS are likely to be amenable to understand-
ng within existing conceptual frameworks. Below, we draw on
uch work to support the interpretation of the results of six focus
roups with the public, one held in each of the UK, Belgium, the
etherlands, Germany, Spain and Poland. A summary of the results
s also available (Upham and Roberts, 2011); here we add further
etail on the method and results, qualitative and quantitative anal-
sis, discussion in relation to contextual literatures and access to
he materials used in the focus groups.
. Methodology
The research method centred on focus groups with pre- and
ost-group questionnaires, with public responses stimulated by a
VD as described below. As a method of opinion elicitation and
xploration, focus groups have the characteristics of being social
nd discussion-based (Morgan and Spanish, 1984). As Bryman
2001, p. 338) argues, focus groups allow the researcher to develop
n understanding of why people feel the way they do. It is possi-
le to allow “. . .people to probe each other’s reasons for holding a
ertainview”andas adiscussionprogresses in a focusgroup, partic-
pants may end up talking about issues that would not have arisen
n an individual interview. For this reason, focus groups are helpful
or eliciting awide variety of different views in relation to a particu-
ar issue (Bryman, 2001). Furthermore, of particular importance for
he current research, focus groups provide an environment where
he participants can learn and absorb new information (Bedford
nd Burgess, 2001).
Focus groups are not intended to provide data that is nationally
epresentative in termsof statistical significance, butare commonly
sed alongside large scale surveys, where resources permit. With
r without such surveys, they provide insights into participants’
hinking in participants’ own terms. Focus groups are susceptible
o a variety of influences, particularly the interventions of the facil-
tator and vocal participants (Stewart et al., 2007). While this may
resent aproblem,dependingon thepurposeof their use, it canalso
e seen as mimicking aspects of natural or everyday conversations.
Focus groups also allow responses to topics (or products) to be
xplored with a degree of facilitator control that can be varied to
uit the research objective. The intention here was to provide the
roupswith identical, carefully defined information and to channel
iscussion along the lines of pre-defined prompts, but to allow dis-
ussion to flow within these constraints relatively freely. As such,
he context was, while not a close simulation of everyday life, and
ertainly not as close as an ethnographic design would allow, still
omewhat similar to a real-world situation in which the partici-
ants might be exposed to and discuss news or factual information
bout CCS. Six such focus groups were held in spring 2010 and par-
icipants were representative of national populations, not drawn
rom carbon storage localities (actual or planned). Table 1 lists the
umber of participants per group, by gender.
The primary objective was to investigate the development of
pinion of CCS through the course of being exposed to new and
dditional information on the technology, with a further view
o informing CCS-related communications strategies. A standard-
sed prompt and information sheet was given to the facilitators to
ncourage common questioning, and the application of a pre- and
ost-focus group questionnaire was used to support further infer-Total 29 27 56
Focus group participants (n=56).
ences on opinion and opinion change. Recruitment and facilitation
was by a commercial market research firm and facilitators had no
specialist environmental orCCSknowledge. This is in contrast to the
main alternative facilitation method of closely moderating discus-
sion, correcting misapprehensions and responding to participant
questions with scientifically defensible information.
Central to the focus groups was a specially commis-
sioned, multi-lingual DVD that explains CCS in the context
of climate change and other energy options and which is
available in six European languages. The film (available at
http://www.communicationnearco2.eu/home/) is intended to be
as neutral and is divided into four sections. The first outlines the
problemof climate change and the growingdemand for energy; the
second refers to the range of options for tackling climate change,
including improved energy efficiency, renewable energy sources
and an introduction to CCS; the fourth sections looks at CCS inmore
depth and outlines associated debates. The ‘CCS story’ thus builds
progressively through the film, to elicit a phased response and
to enable the influence of additional information to be observed.
Responses were also sought to supplementary textual and graphi-
cal information provided after the DVD, specific to the nationality
of each focus group, explaining why it will be difficult to avoid the
use of CCS in Europe evenwith amajor expansion of renewable and
energy efficiency. In addition to the focus groups, the participants
were asked to complete a questionnaire before and after thediscus-
sions, with questions intended to aid observation of the evolution
of opinion and identify differences and commonalities between the
groups.
The research generated a large amount of both quantitative
data from the questionnaires and qualitative data from the focus
group discussions. The data from the questionnaires was input to
SPSS (statistical analysis software) to produce descriptive statistics,
which were used to provide an overview of how the participants’
perspectives changed as a result of their focus group discussion.
These trendswere thenused as the starting point for the qualitative
data analysis.
Analysis of qualitative data can be problematic and often
uses less structured processes than those used by quantitative
researchers. Consequently the qualitative research software AtlasTI
was used as an aid. Such software provides a useful tool for the sys-
tematic analysis of data and allows the researcher to assign codes
to segments of text; these codes can then be grouped, annotated
and linked together to investigate and develop lines of argument.
The pre- and post-questionnaire results need to be interpreted cau-
tiously and in context. Some of what we observed, particularly
differences between nationalities, may be specific to the particular
location or respondents involved. Indeed the results of the study
as a whole are not intended to represent the opinions of the whole
population. Studies with small numbers of participants exchange
the higher certainty and replicability obtainable with large scale,
controlled studies, for more detailed information on the variety of
possibilities. In other words, while large scale controlled studies
P. Upham, T. Roberts / International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 5 (2011) 1359–1367 1361



































quency of occurrence, as identified via the coding process, is shown
in Fig. 1. Whereas Fig. 1 shows all themes, regardless of whether
they were mentioned in only some of the groups, Fig. 2 shows only
those themes thatwere raised in all of the groups. Fig. 3 then shows
Table 2
Focus group participants’ perceptions of the information provided.









73 22 5Fig. 1. Semi-prompted CCS discus
rovide replicability when repeated under very similar conditions
whichmaynotalwayspertain in the ‘real-world’), qualitative stud-
es provide an indication of the types of issues and responses that a
opic may elicits – responses that may vary somewhat from group
o group.
. Results
.1. Perception of information quality
The level and quantity of information provided to the par-
icipants reflected the constraints of the research design (time,
xpectation that participants would know little about CCS, the
ntention to expose participants to contextual as well as CCS-
elated information in stages, so that the evolution of opinion could
e observed). In addition it was important that the information
as presented in a manner that permitted lines of discussion to
volve without close moderation, in order to simulate real-world
onditions of people being exposed to information on CCS and then
iscussing it with non-experts. The informationwas intended to be
s neutral as possible, in the sense of being consistent with major-
ty scientific opinion. In this regard, IPCC was used as a benchmark
ource: anthropogenic climate change is treated as conclusive, a
ide range of lower carbon energy options are seen as likely to be
elpful in avoiding ‘dangerous climate change’ and CCS is seen as
aving considerable potential in this regard,while at the same time
eing associated with a variety of non-trivial uncertainties (IPCC,
005, 2007).
While thequestionnaire ratings indicated thatparticipantswere
enerally positive about the quality of the information provided, it
as also clear that most felt that they would need a lot more infor-
ation, probably from a wider range of sources, before they felt
ble to make a firm decision on CCS. This is highlighted in Table 2
nd was not unexpected, being consistent with the findings of pre-
ious research. Providing sufficient information would be possible
ut would require a different research design (e.g. citizens’ panels
r a detailed information choice questionnaire). In short, partici-
ants considered the information of good quality but insufficient
n and of itself to help in coming to a firm conclusion.Fig. 2. Frequency of topics referred to in all groups: contextual and CCS-specific.
3.2. Themes evident in the discussions



















































iig. 3. Relative contribution of each focus group to topic reference frequency.
he relative contribution of each group to those shared themes.
otable observations include: some 50% of the ‘confusion’ refer-
ncesare in theUKgroup; some35%of theCCScost referencesare in
he German group; the small percentage of positive CCS references
n the Spanish group; the small percentage of trust in government,
overnment approach and individual self-efficacy (impact) refer-
nces in the Polish group; and the relatively large number of trust
n science references in the Netherlands group.
.3. Notable contextual themes
.3.1. General acceptance of climate change
With theexceptionof theNetherlands (40%, forwhich there isno
bvious explanation), 70–100% of the participants stated that they
ere concerned about climate change in the pre-focus group ques-
ionnaire and this was also reflected in the focus group discussions.
he discussions about climate change in the Netherlands group
entred on the ‘climate-gate’ debacle that emerged just before the
N COP-15 climate change conference in Copenhagen (for scien-
ific discussion, see e.g. Heffernan, 2010). Itwas clear that a number
f the participants had been heavily influenced by the associated
ebates evident in the news media.
The participants in the Spanish focus group appeared particu-
arly concernedabout the impacts of climate change and repeatedly
eferred to thehot summers that theyhadexperienced recently and
he increasingly regularwater shortages. Across all the focusgroups
uch of the discussions about climate change focused around the
cale of the problem. In particular, many of the respondents felt
hat there was very little they could do as individuals or even as
ndividual countries to tackle climate change. In the majority of
he focus groups, except Poland, the participants continually com-
ented that they felt there was little point in ‘us’ taking action as
ountries such as China, India and the USA are unlikely to pull their
eight.
.3.2. The high salience of energy cost
According to the results of the pre-workshop questionnaire,
ith the exception of Spain, the most important factor in deter-
ining which electricity production methods should be used was
cost’ (the Spanish participants considered helping to prevent cli-
ate change the most important). Indeed, participants in the UK,
ermany and Poland thought that the costs associated with CCS
ere a major disadvantage of the technology. The Polish focus
roup was particularly concerned about cost: participants strongly
elt that Poland was still a relatively poor country compared to
ome other European nations and did not have sufficient financial
esources to invest innewenergy technologies. Indeed, the strongly
eld view across all of the groups was that the financial resource
or new energy technologies is limited and that it would be better
f this was invested in renewables than in CCS.Fig. 4. (a) Gas CCS: a shift from undecided to negative opinion after film and dis-
cussion. (b) Coal CCS: a shift from undecided to negative opinion after film and
discussion.
There was, moreover, a general consensus that new low car-
bon energy technologies will be expensive and in general people
were unhappy about the prospects of higher energy bills. The Pol-
ish participants were particularly concerned about rising costs and
pointed out that many people in Poland were already struggling
to pay their energy bills. More specifically participants in all coun-
tries were concerned that the financial risks associated with CCS
were significantly greater than with renewable technologies. Par-
ticipants in the German and Belgian groups were concerned that if
we invest in CCS now, we would still have to invest in renewables
in the future. Hence there was a general feeling that in the long run
itwould be cheaper to invest in renewables now. Furthermore, par-
ticipants from the UK and Germany were worried about the long
term costs of monitoring the stored CO2. These debates about cost
led to further discussions about who should pay for new technolo-
gies; there was consensus that if CCS was to be deployed, the bill
should be predominately met by the power companies. However,
the participants were equally sceptical that this would be the case
and considered that CCS would inevitably lead to higher energy
bills.
3.3.3. Use of technology analogues
Participants’ general lack of knowledge of CCS led many of them
to use more familiar energy technologies as reference points, and
these differed according to the local contexts. In the UK, Spain,
Netherlands, Poland and Germany a direct comparison was made
between the storage of nuclear waste and the storage of CO2. The
Chernobyl nuclear power station disaster was quoted numerous
times in Poland, Belgium and the UK. In Poland the participants
appeared to be particularly nervous about nuclear waste, as Poland
was considered as having suffered particularly from the Chernobyl
disaster. These fears about nuclear waste appeared to transcend
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roviding further evidence to support the argument that many of
he participants failed to properly understand the nature of CO2.
n contrast, a number of the participants from the UK argued that
hen people discuss nuclear power they automatically consider
t to be dangerous because of Chernobyl. However, they went on
o conclude that it was actually a relatively safe method of power
eneration and gave several examples, including Sellafield and
ungeness nuclear power stations in the UK, which they felt had
ood safety records. This line of discussion eventually led some
f the participants to argue that if the technology was in place to
afely operate a nuclear power station, then CCS should also be able
o operate safely.
In Belgium, Germany and the UK, the examples of natural gas
torage and transport were referred to by the participants in their
fforts to understand CCS. In the UK and Germany there was a gen-
ral feeling that if natural gas couldbe stored safely and transported
o people’s homes, then the same should be possible with CO2.
owever, in Belgium, the Ghilenghien gas pipe explosion which
illed 24 in 2004 was used as an example of how dangerous gas
ipelines could be.
.3.4. Perceptions of CCS risks
As observed above, risk perception has become a key area of
nterest in understanding public perceptions of CCS. The NearCO2
ocusgroupparticipantswereconcernedaboutawide rangeof risks
ssociated with the technology, but these may be classified into
hree groups: physical risks (i.e. concerns about safety), financial
isks and governance risks (i.e. concerns about the way the tech-
ology will be managed). While there were some differences in
he ways that the participants conceptualised risks relating to CCS
cross the six countries, the commonalities were more evident.
In terms of physical risks, participants in all of the focus groups
ere most concerned about the storage aspect of the CCS chain.
n total, concerns about the risks involved with storing CO2 were
aised 58 times across all of the focus groups, compared to 24 times
or transport and 3 times for the process of capturing CO2. In partic-
lar, there was a general consensus that it would be impossible to
uarantee that the CO2 would not leak out and that there is a dan-
er that storing CO2 could lead to significant problems for future
enerations. Many of the conversations focused on the potential
mpact of any leakage and were in a large part fuelled by the
onfusion about the nature of CO2 identified above; a number of
he participants appeared to think that CO2 is highly flammable
nd/or explosive. In Poland and the UK specific concerns were also
aised about the impact of future tectonicmovement on storedCO2.
hese concerns about the dangers of CO2 leakage prompted exten-
ive discussions about suitable locations for CO2 storage. While the
ajority of participants were unhappy about any form of storage
ndparticularly storage near their homes, others felt that providing
ppropriate risk assessments were conducted, it might be accept-
ble to store CO2 offshore (in geological formations – deep-sea
torage was not referred to in the DVD, nor raised by participants).
he post-focus group questionnaire revealed that 53% of the par-
icipants would be more accepting of offshore storage than storage
n land. There was an interesting debate between participants in
oth the Polish and Dutch focus groups, with some arguing that
hey felt storing CO2 offshore would be a safe short term solution
hile others argued that ‘dumping’ waste at sea was dangerous, as
e do not know enough about the marine environment to predict
he impact of leakage.
.3.5. Trust issues
The risks associated with the governance of CCS also provoked
high level of debate and is likely to represent a major challenge
or future public acceptability. The focus group data indicated that
any of the participants trusted neither government nor industryeenhouse Gas Control 5 (2011) 1359–1367 1363
to manage CCS objectively and safely, and according to the post-
focus group questionnaire, only 25% of respondents said that they
trusted either government or industry in relation to CCS. There was
a general sense across all of the focus groups that both industry and
government have predominantly economic and financial priorities
and that they are less concerned about whether CCS represents the
best solution to the CO2 problem. Scientists were regarded as a
more reliable source of independent information on CCS, but there
was concern that governments and industrywere unlikely to act on
scientific advice if itwent against their interests. Itwas felt that gov-
ernments were under a huge amount of pressure from oil industry
lobbyists to find ways to extend our reliance on fossil fuels. Fur-
thermore, a number of people from the UK and Spain commented
that when it comes to environmental issues, governments seem
unable to either make or keep to international agreements. This
led to a number of people arguing that there would be no point in
a few countries developing expensive CCS projects without some
kind of guarantee that high absolute emitters such as theUSA, India
and China would also implement the technology. However, partic-
ipants from Belgium argued that CCS was plausible across Europe,
providing sufficient leadership was given by the European Union.
3.4. Attitude change in response to information exposure
While the account provided of CCS was scientifically defensible,
it was anticipated that the focus group participants would bring
their own frames of reference to the issues and that they would
likely raise a variety of concerns. What was not known was how
these responses would develop through the course of being pro-
vided with an increasing level of information, how these responses
might differ between national groups, or how initial perceptions
might shift in response to informationexposure. Table3 categorises
the issues raised in response to particular film stages and discus-
sion topics. All are potentially disruptive to CCS implementation
and may well be raised by the public as issues in other CCS-related
fora.
The pre-questionnaire provided an indication of the contex-
tual environmental attitudes of the participants: more people said
they were concerned than not concerned about a wide range of
environmental issues, such as: acid rain; air pollution; climate
change; deforestation; household waste disposal; species extinc-
tion; and the use of non-renewable resources. Participants viewed
renewable energy (bioenergy, solar, wind, wave, tidal and hydro-
electricity) more favourably than coal and nuclear. The majority
viewed natural gas as mainly favourable.
Comparing the pre- and post-focus group questionnaires shows
that 45% of the participants remained consistent in their attitude
towards climate change, agreeingwith the statement that ‘the risks
of climate change far outweigh the benefits’. However, after the
focus groups, a sizeable minority – 29%, including nine more indi-
viduals than before the groups – either agreed with the statement
that ‘the benefits of climate change either equalled the risks of cli-
mate change’, or agreed with the statement that ‘the benefits of
climate change exceeded the risks’. In other words, for a sizeable
minority there was not only a persistent disbelief in the insignifi-
cance of climate change, but a shift in that direction.
Secondly, there was also an aggregate pre-post shift from no
opinion/do not know to negative opinion for attitudes to both gas
CCS and coal CCS: see Fig. 4a and b. After the discussion, while the
percentage of peoplewhowere ‘mainly favourable’ in their attitude
to coal and gas CCS maintained this attitude before and after the
discussion, most of those in the no opinion/do not know category
shifted to a ‘mainly unfavourable’ and a ‘very unfavourable’ stance.
Before the focus groups, opinion was fairly evenly split between
unfavourable and favourable attitudes for coal CCS and gas CCS,
with a large no opinion/do not know response for both. There was
1364 P. Upham, T. Roberts / International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 5 (2011) 1359–1367
Table 3
Themes potentially disruptive to CCS implementation, elicited in response to five sequential aspects of a CCS rationale.
1. Climate change 2. Energy options 3. Description of CCS 4. CCS debates 5. Energy mix detail
• Uncertainty over whether
climate change is happening or
natural
• Nuclear power as less
polluting than CCS
• Low confidence in the
integrity of CO2 storage
• Doubts about the credibility
of the EC as an information
source
• CCS as a distraction from the
need to advance renewable
energy
• Doubts over IPCC’s credibility • Renewable energy as less
polluting than CCS
• Earth movements may
release stored CO2
• CCS as a distraction from the
need to advance renewable
energy and pro-climate action
• Uncertainty over whether
climate change is happening or
natural
• Perception of limited self-and
national-efficacy and
responsibility
• Politicians leading affluent,
high-emission lives
• 1km storage depth is not
deep enough (susceptible to
Earth movements and too close
to people)
• Distrust of the political
motives of the oil industry
• Inequity in the international
distribution of climate
mitigation costs
• Difficulty in relating climate
change to everyday lives
• Stored CO2 as a potential soil
pollutant








• Not enough information on
the pros and cons of CCS
relative to alternatives
• CCS as a short term solution • CCS unproven
• CCS unproven • Perception of limited self-and
national-efficacy
• CCS as end-of-pipe
• More information needed on
CCS risks
• Mistrust that CCS would be
for bridging only
• The advantages relative to
renewable are unclear





















ote: not all themes were evident in all groups.
o corresponding pre/post change for the several renewables and
he pre/post change for nuclear (Fig. 5) was the reverse of that for
CS: the aggregate level of undecided nuclear opinion shifted to an
ncrease in the number of those favourably disposed to nuclear. It
s also notable that, of the range of energy options, coal and nuclear
licited themost evenly dividedopinion:whereas a sizeablemajor-
ty were in favour of other options, opinion was fairly evenly split
n coal and nuclear, though bio-CCS (Fig. 6) elicited a very large no
pinion/do not know response of 58% and post-focus group opin-
on shifted to the negative from an initial no opinion/do not know
osition. This was more likely through the association with CCS
han through any considered understanding of bio-CCS.
Prior to watching the DVD, participant’s attitudes to CCS were
argely consistent across all of the countries. People were clearly
nterested in the potential of the technology but concerned about
he risks involved, particularly related to the long term storage
f CO2. As the discussions about CCS developed and more infor-
ig. 5. Nuclear power: a shift fromundecided/negative to positive opinion after film
nd discussion.uppliers
mation was provided, opinions on CCS started to become more
diverse between the six countries. However, the general concern
that participants did not have enough information to make a deci-
sion remained constant across all the focus groups. Participants
from the UK and Netherlands were most supportive of the tech-
nology, but this was conditional on it being a short term option for
reducing emissionswhile renewable technologieswere developed.
Participants from the remaining four focus groups appeared to
become more negative and confused about the technology as they
were provided with information. In Germany, Spain, Poland and
Belgium, the participants repeatedly asked questions suggesting
that they understood CO2 to be flammable, explosive and toxic (e.g.
‘What happens if it explodes?’ ‘Will it pollute the earth’s core?’).
These confusions stimulated further conversations that went on
to dominate much of the discussions, emphasising the problem of
information management in real world settings – a problem that
controlled questionnaire surveys generally cannot reflect.
Fig. 6. Biomass CCS: a shift from undecided to negative opinion after film and dis-
cussion.





































pFig. 7. Post-focus group level of support for CCS.
.5. Post-focus group opinion on CCS
The more detailed post-focus group questions on CCS reflected
he qualitatively expressed views, concerns, uncertainty and occa-
ional contradiction. An example of the latter can be seen when
omparing the level of post-focus group support for CCS (Fig. 7)
ith opiniononwhether CCS shouldbe included inNational Energy
olicy (Fig. 8). While over 60% of the participants did not support
CS, over 50% considered that CCS should be included in national
nergy policy. Furthermore, while 56% of participants agreed with
he statement: ‘I think that our government would not allow CCS
o go ahead if they thought that the risk of substantial leakage was
igh’ (though a sizeable 27% were neutral), 80% agreed with the
tatement: ‘if I lived near a carbon dioxide storage site, I’d be very
oncerned about leakage’, with only 10% neutral on this.
ig. 8. Post-focus group support for temporary inclusion of CCS in national energy
olicy.
Fig. 9. Post-focus group percentage wanting more information about CCS.Fig. 10. Level of concern differentiated by stage in the CCS chain.
As Fig. 9 shows, the participants were less equivocal about the
need for more information, a finding that is likely to explain some
of the contradictions in the data. It is clear that by the end of the
focus group, many of the participants were left with unanswered
questions about CCS technology and the way it would be imple-
mented. Fig. 10 shows that although the participants had concerns
about all aspects of the CCS chain, concerns about storage were
the most prominent; this was also reflected in the qualitative find-
ings. It also shows that the participants were less concerned about
undersea storage than storage under a residential area.
The post-focus group questionnaire supported one of the key
messages from the focus groups, namely that there is a lack of trust
in the institutions that would be tasked with implementing and
monitoring CCS. Only 25% of the participants agreedwith the state-
ment: ‘I think that our government can be relied upon to monitor
and manage carbon dioxide storage in the long term’, with 36%
being neutral on this and 39% disagreeing. Trust in industry’s capa-
bility was similarly low, with some 27% agreeing that ‘industry can
be relied upon to monitor and manage carbon dioxide storage in
the long term’, with 38% neutral and 36% disagreeing.
A final question on attitudes to CCS then asked for an overall
rating of the technology on a scale of 1–10, where 1 was the worst
rating and 10 the best rating. The response approximated a nor-
mal distribution, with a mode of 3, a median of 4.5 and a mean of
4.58. While open to alternative interpretations, we would suggest
that this pattern indicates a high level of uncertainty among the
participants. Only a third considered that the focus group had pro-
vided themwith enough information to decidewhether CCS should
be used within Europe (32% yes, 68% no). Cross-tabulation shows
no strongly positive or negative association between participants
considering that they had been given enough, or not enough infor-
mation, and their rating of CCS. Rather, considering that not enough
information had been given was associated with rating CCS in the
relatively large range of 3–7 out of 10, i.e. either side of the mean.
This may be again interpreted as a state of open-mindedness or
uncertainty, compared to having come to a firm conclusion.
4. Discussion
To some extent, we can interpret the rather negative public
opinion of CCS as consistent with the ‘risk society’ thesis, which
posits that society has become pre-occupied with the future and
with risk (Giddens, 1999). As Beck and Kropp (2007) note, it has
now become almost trivial to state that risk is a social construc-
tion. Yet it would be wrong to imply that the low level of approval
of CCS found in the six focus groups is simply culturally determined,
in the sense of being a reflection of a time in which risk concern has






























































p366 P. Upham, T. Roberts / International Journa
ecome exaggerated. Not only are there ‘real’ geological uncertain-
ies – real in the sense of being scientifically-informed – but the
ublic in-principle preference for renewable energy is a legitimate
ne. An example of such a geological uncertainty is the extent of
O2 water solubility (Gilfillan et al., 2009), which potentially has
ubstantial implications for CO2 leakage and permanence under
articular conditions. Similarly, public distrust of the power sector
ndECpolicymakers could be considered tohave some justification
ia the over-supply of emissions credits under the EU Emissions
rading Scheme and consequent windfall profits that have accrued
o emitters. A Point Carbon estimate for WWF judges this profit
o be in the region of 23–63 billion euros for the second alloca-
ion period (Point Carbon, 2008). Other, site-specific reasons for
bjectionmay relate tomore than perception of risk alone: review-
ng public participation procedures in CCS and analogous non-CCS
roposals in Europe, Desbarats et al. (2010) note that while public
pposition in Barendrecht did relate to perceptions of risk, it also
elated to other perceptions, such as over-industrialisation of the
ocality.
Nonetheless, Europe undoubtedly faces very significant energy
nd climate change challenges. It will need to replace half of its
ower stations by 2020 (or install alternative generation capacity),
ven assuming energy efficiency improvements are made across
he economy (Market Observatory for Energy, 2008). Even with a
ajor increase in renewable energy generation, plus new nuclear
ower plants, it is unlikely that Europe could avoid building at least
ome new power plants that use either coal or gas in the next 10
ears. Similarly, although global energy scenarios from a variety of
ources envisage differing supply mixes and levels of energy effi-
iency, coal and gas remain unavoidably prominent in all major
cenarios for several decades to come (Luukkanen et al., 2009).
Given this, public objection toCCS inprinciple andon theground
ay appear unreasonable and uninformed. Yet the disjunction
etween reality and the publicly perceived ideal of a largely and
mmediately renewable future can be viewed as partly a conse-
uence of the substantially delayed timing of the policy response.
hy is it that renewable energy has been seriously incentivised
o late, relative to the EC aspiration of not exceeding a global sur-
ace temperature increase of 2 ◦C? We do not seek to answer this
uestion here, but it should not be surprising to find public opinion
agging behind climate and energy supply issues to which policy
as only belatedly and recently begun to respond itself. Rather
han acting early and allowing time for the renewable sector to
radually replace at least the fossil fuelled power sector, energy
olicy-makers now face a variety of immediate and conflicting
nvironmental and commercial pressures, in addition to public
pinion that has significant doubts about CCS.
The result is a challenging environment for those tasked with
onvincing anddelivering onnewenergy technologies, particularly
here there are non-negligible scientific uncertainties. In terms of
ublic communication and engagement in the broad sense, the sit-
ation requires that the case for CCS is successfully made in a short
paceof timeatmore thanone level. That is, not onlywith respect to
ncertainties relating to leakage risk and associatedpublic concern,
ut also in relation to NGO and others’ scepticism of CCS acting to
ntentionally or unintentionally extend fossil fuel lock-in. In partic-
lar the case for coal CCS presents a wealth of difficulties (Vergragt,
009), as the life cycle energy penalty of CCS currently renders it
ittle better in terms of CO2 emissions than the best available exist-
ng fossil fuel technology (advanced gas-fired combined heat and
ower) (Viebahn et al., 2007).
In these respects, CCS advocates and developers in Europe may
ace political contexts similar to those experienced by advocates
f other large infrastructure projects in which alliances of national
GOs, local citizens and mobile eco-protestors challenge national
olicy (e.g. airport expansion, nuclear power or waste facility sit-eenhouse Gas Control 5 (2011) 1359–1367
ing). In this scenario, local siting proposals are used to challenge
national policy in the absence of other fora for debate (Owens,
2001). On the other hand, there are a number of factors, options
and associated perceptions that may mitigate against a similar
situation, their significance likely varying by country and loca-
tion: the option of offshore geological storage; the urgency of
climate change; the ambivalence of some environmental NGOs
with respect to CCS, particularly regarding its ability to substi-
tute for nuclear power; and perceptions of the economic and
employment value of CCS through its supply chain (e.g. Scottish
Government and Scottish Enterprise, 2010). Nonetheless, while the
chances of uncomplicated deployment of CCS throughout Europe
are not high, in general the context should be characterised as dif-
ficult and sensitive rather than impossible.
5. Conclusions
Overall, theNearCO2 focus groups confirmmany of the key find-
ings of previous qualitative studies of CCS perceptions in Europe.
That is, the general public are relatively unfamiliarwith CCS; have a
preference for renewable energyover CCS; have significant concern
relating to the risks involvedwith storingCO2; and lack trust in gov-
ernment and industry tomake the right decisions in this context. In
terms of international comparison and the influence of contextual
issues, the difference in opinion between countries was minimal
and many of the same issues occurred in all of the groups. All of the
issues raised pose potential problems for deploying CCS and many
will not be straightforward to resolve. Given also the political and
policy context of public concern, we conclude that there are likely
to be substantial challenges to the deployment ofwhat is becoming
a controversial emissions mitigation option.
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